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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 Compared to some of the grand old journals of the legal academy, 
the Florida State University Law Review is tender in age. In thirty-
two short years of publication, our readership has grown along with 
our reputation. As the academy has come to recognize our contribu-
tions to the legal debate, the opportunities for our journal to publish 
quality scholarship have increased dramatically in recent years. The 
articles that find their way to our Selection Committee have grown 
ever more tempting, and our prior format of publishing three general 
interest issues and a Legislative Edition has grown ever more confin-
ing. This format required the Review to forgo timely general interest 
articles in favor of one yearly edition dedicated to Florida issues. 
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Though the Legislative Edition was noble in purpose, it imposed the 
unnecessary restriction of publishing Florida-specific issues just once 
per year. Beginning with Volume 32, the Review will no longer pub-
lish the Legislative Edition. To serve our readers by reporting Flor-
ida-specific issues in a timely matter, the Review will now publish a 
Recent Developments feature that will appear alongside the general 
interest articles. 
 Our vision for the Recent Developments is one that explores and 
criticizes cases and developments that we believe our readership will 
find interesting. This might be because a case bodes to be seminal in 
a particular area of the law; this might be because a case presents 
particular public policy opportunities; this might be because a case is 
prominent in the public consciousness. Although we will analyze fed-
eral cases and Florida legislation, particularly when such cases and 
legislation may interest our readers, our primary focus for the Recent 
Developments will be the state courts of Florida. 
 For our first installment of the Recent Developments, we present 
cases from both Florida state courts and the federal judiciary.1  The 
opening Note examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. 
Washington,2 which, though it replaces a subjective and malleable 
Confrontation Clause analysis with a bedrock guarantee, may none-
theless have uncertain and sweeping effects in the realm of criminal 
practice. Next, we take a look at the Supreme Court’s latest interpre-
tation of the jurisdictional requirements of the Clean Water Act in 
South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of In-
dians.3  The last federal opinion we consider is the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision in Café Erotica v. St. Johns County,4 which provides a new 
vehicle for analysis at the intersection of the First Amendment and 
local sign ordinances. 
 Our coverage of the Supreme Court of Florida begins with Haire v. 
Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services,5 which 
serves as the latest installment in the ongoing citrus canker saga. 
Next, State v. Jones6 examines the tension between a prosecutor try-
                                                                                                                    
 1. Danielle Appignani, Chris Hamilton, Shane Ramsey, Michelle Robichaud, Ty 
Roofner, Jessica Slatten, and Christian Turner contributed to the inaugural installment of 
the Recent Developments. 
 We would also like to extend our thanks to the professors and practitioners who pro-
vided able assistance to our contributors.  Professors Rob Atkinson, David Markell, J.B. 
Ruhl, Jennifer LaVia, and Gary S. Edinger, Esq., all supplied invaluable guidance in our 
analyses. Finally, the Law Review owes a tremendous debt of gratitude to Professor 
Charles Ehrhardt for his instrumental role in guiding and assisting the publication of the 
first Recent Developments. 
 2. 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). 
 3. 124 S. Ct. 1537 (2004). 
 4. 360 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 5. 870 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2004). 
 6. 867 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2004). 





ing a defendant and an impermissible comment on the defendant’s 
right to remain silent. In Topps v. State,7 the court clarifies the stan-
dard for res judicata in Florida courts. Finally, in Clay Electric Coop-
erative, Inc. v. Johnson,8 the Florida Supreme Court invokes the “un-
dertaker’s doctrine” to create a tort duty to the public for utilities 
that supply street lighting. It is with pride that we present the Flor-
ida State University Law Review’s inaugural Recent Developments. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—CONFRONTATION CLAUSE—REESTABLISHING 
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES—UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT OVERTURNS CRIMINAL CONVICTION BECAUSE 
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE USED AT TRIAL VIOLATED THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE—Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 
(2004). 
 The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him . . . .”9 Despite this provision, since the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts,10 the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee of the right to confrontation was replaced with a subjec-
tive reliability analysis. Under Roberts, lower courts across the coun-
try have struggled to determine the circumstances in which particu-
lar out-of-court statements should be admitted at trial.11 This doc-
trine permits a judge to admit an out-of-court statement if it bears 
adequate “indicia of reliability.”12 Reliability can be inferred if the 
statement falls under a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or contains 
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”13 The Roberts Court 
elected to allow the common law to develop the definition of these 
terms. 
 Left without guidance as to the actual application of this new test, 
the lower courts forged ahead in the search for “reliability” and 
“trustworthiness.” Widespread inconsistencies resulted. For instance, 
in Virginia, a state court of appeals thought a statement more reli-
able if the witness was in custody and charged with a crime.14 In di-
rect contrast, a Wisconsin court held that a statement was more reli-
able if the witness was not in custody and not a suspect.15 Further-
                                                                                                                    
 7. 865 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2004). 
 8. 873 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 2003). 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 10. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). 
 11. See infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. 
 12. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
 13. Id.  
 14. See Nowlin v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E.2d 367, 371-72 (Va. App. 2003), abrogated 
by Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1354. 
 15. State v. Bintz, 650 N.W.2d 913, 918 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002), abrogated by Crawford, 
124 S. Ct. at 1354. 
282  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:279 
 
  
more, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that if a codefendant vol-
untarily makes a statement to police, and if the codefendant is free to 
leave at any time during the interview, then a statement inculpating 
the defendant and the codefendant is admissible against both.16 
However, in Oregon, the same statement would be admissible even if 
the witness is not free to leave at any time.17 
 The set of circumstances presented by Crawford further exempli-
fied the difficulty of the Roberts framework. In Crawford, petitioner 
Michael Crawford was charged with the attempted murder of a man 
who had allegedly attempted to rape his wife, Sylvia.18 Crawford con-
fessed that he went in search of the victim, Kenneth Lee, and ulti-
mately stabbed Lee in the torso during a physical confrontation.19 At 
trial, Crawford claimed the stabbing was in self-defense, but though 
his hand was cut in the fight, his original statement to police was 
ambiguous as to whether he had indeed acted in self-defense.20 Sylvia 
witnessed the stabbing and offered the police an equally ambiguous 
statement describing the stabbing.21 Nevertheless, at trial, Sylvia’s 
tape-recorded statement was introduced as evidence that the stab-
bing was not in self-defense.22 The statement was admitted over the 
petitioner’s objection that it violated the Confrontation Clause, and 
the jury subsequently convicted Crawford.23  
 Relying on the Roberts framework, the trial court admitted the 
statement on the ground that the statement bore “particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.”24 The Washington Court of Appeals, 
employing a nine-factor balancing test, reversed;25 however, the 
Washington Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, unanimously 
                                                                                                                    
 16. People v. Schutte, 613 N.W.2d 370, 375-76 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000), abrogated by 
Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1354.  
 17. State v. Franco, 950 P.2d 348, 352-53 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).  
 18. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1357. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. In his trial testimony, Crawford said: “[T]his is just a possibility, but I 
think . . . that he pulled something out and I grabbed for it . . . .” Id. 
 21. See id. 
 22. Id. at 1358.  Sylvia was unavailable to Crawford for cross-examination because of 
the state marital privilege, which prohibits one spouse from testifying against another 
without the consent of the spouse against whom testimony is offered. Id. at 1357. In a foot-
note, Scalia reserved the question of whether a defendant waives his right to confront wit-
nesses under the Confrontation Clause by invoking the privilege. Id. at 1359 n.1.  
 23. Id. at 1358. 
 24. Id. Among the reasons the trial court found Sylvia’s statement reliable: she was 
not shifting blame from herself to Crawford; she was an eyewitness possessing direct 
knowledge; she was describing recent events; and the statements were made to a police of-
ficer. Id. 
 25. Id. The court reversed, in part, because Sylvia’s statements to police conflicted 
with her prior statements and she admitted she had shut her eyes during the stabbing. Id. 





concluding that the petitioner’s and Sylvia’s statements interlocked 
and, thus, were reliable.26  
 Justice Scalia wrote for the Crawford Court and began his analy-
sis with a lengthy discussion of the history of the Confrontation 
Clause.27 Per Scalia, this history supports two inferences about the 
Framers’ intended meaning of the Confrontation Clause. First, it 
suggests that not all hearsay implicates the Clause or the core con-
cerns of the Sixth Amendment.28 According to Scalia, the chief con-
cern of the Confrontation Clause was witnesses who “bear testimony” 
against the accused.29 With this concern in mind, Scalia focused the 
Confrontation Clause analysis on a specific type of out-of-court 
statement: “testimonial” statements.30 Second, the history of the 
Clause supports the notion that “the Framers would not have al-
lowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not 
appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defen-
dant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”31 
 After establishing these two principles, Scalia recalled prior case 
law and found the Court’s decisions “largely consistent with these 
two principles.”32 In past cases, testimonial statements had only been 
admitted when the declarant was unavailable and when the defen-
dant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.33 Thus, while the de-
cisions may ultimately have been correct, the rationales employed by 
the Court in reaching these results have been far from consistent or 
correct. Specifically, Ohio v. Roberts encapsulates the Court’s incon-
sistencies in dissecting and applying the Confrontation Clause.34 No-
tably absent from the doctrine adopted by the Court in Roberts is any 
mention whatsoever of the textual guarantee of the right to confront 
one’s accusers.35 Instead of guiding the lower courts with a clear rule, 
the Supreme Court’s formulation charged the lower courts with dis-
                                                                                                                    
 26. Id. While both Sylvia’s and petitioner’s statements indicated that the victim, Lee, 
was possibly grabbing for a weapon, the Washington Supreme Court found their state-
ments equally unsure as to when this event took place. They were also equally uncertain 
as to how the petitioner received the cut on his hand. In this manner, their statements in-
terlocked. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1359. Among the historical examples weighing on the Framers’ mind re-
garding the evils of unconfronted testimony included the 1603 English trial of Sir Walter 
Raleigh for treason, where Raleigh’s alleged accomplice made statements against him 
which were read to the jury. Id. The jury convicted Raleigh and sentenced him to death 
based upon unrebutted testimony. Id. at 1360. 
 28. Id. at 1364.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. With this pronouncement, the Court introduced a new term into the vernacu-
lar of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. For a discussion of the implications of this new 
vocabulary, see infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 31. Id. at 1365. 
 32. Id. at 1367. 
 33. Id. at 1369. 
 34. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1354. 
 35. See id. at 70-75. 
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cerning a set of circumstances in which an out-of-court statement 
could be deemed “reliable.”36 The Roberts framework perhaps as-
sumed that the lower courts would eventually settle and agree on a 
uniform set of criteria that could be consistently applied. Unfortu-
nately, the lower courts struggled in their decisions, failed to achieve 
uniformity, and left the Confrontation Clause without a minimum 
baseline guarantee.  
 The Court continued the reliability-based framework of Roberts in 
Idaho v. Wright.37 Wright involved the admission of statements of the 
defendant’s daughter, the alleged abuse victim, to a pediatrician 
while she was in police protective custody.38 In a five-to-four decision, 
the Court held that the witness’s statement was not sufficiently reli-
able to be admitted.39 This decision demonstrates what Scalia pro-
poses in Crawford: the right decision reached by way of the wrong ra-
tionale.  
 In Wright, the Court opined that the witness’s out-of-court state-
ment should be evaluated by consideration of “the totality of the cir-
cumstances.”40 Thus, under Roberts, determining the “particularized 
guarantee[] of trustworthiness”41 required consideration on a case-by-
case basis, in which the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
making of the statement itself was used to determine the overall re-
liability of an out-of-court witness statement. Such a case-by-case 
approach invited the type of inconsistent balancing tests for reliabil-
ity that the lower courts have utilized. As Scalia observed, “replacing 
categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing 
tests . . . [does] violence to [the Framers’] design.”42 
 The Court realized that the Roberts framework was misguided. It 
replaced a constitutionally-prescribed method of ensuring reliability 
with a subjective judicial determination. As Scalia pointed out, “the 
Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a 
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.”43 Chiefly, it was 
this procedural focus that was lost in the Court’s confrontation 
analysis over the past several decades. The Confrontation Clause 
does not require that evidence in fact be reliable, but rather that “re-
liability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible 
of cross-examination.”44 With such a pronouncement, there was no 
                                                                                                                    
 36. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. 
 37. 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
 38. Id. at 809-10. 
 39. Id. at 826-27. 
 40. Id. at 826. 
 41. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 124 
S. Ct. 1354 (2004). 
 42. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1373. 
 43. Id. at 1370. 
 44. Id. 





way to salvage Roberts. The Court rejected the Roberts framework, 
and Scalia stamped its death certificate with a particularly poignant 
pronouncement: “Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is 
obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a de-
fendant is obviously guilty.”45 
 While it is certain that the Roberts framework is no longer appli-
cable for testimonial evidence, the Crawford opinion leaves many 
open questions. If the Confrontation Clause only governs testimonial 
evidence, then perhaps the biggest question is what the Court means 
by the word “testimonial.” Justice Scalia did not exhaustively define 
the phrase, but he noted that it includes in-court testimony, as well 
as affidavits, depositions, custodial examinations, confessions, prior 
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross, and statements 
made during police interrogations.46 
 Equally as challenging as defining the scope of the term “testimo-
nial” is defining the scope of the term “nontestimonial.” Justice 
Scalia pointed out a few of the hearsay exceptions that are nontesti-
monial, including business records and statements in furtherance of 
a conspiracy.47 In so doing, Scalia referred to age-old exceptions to 
the general rule of exclusion of hearsay evidence.48 This reference 
seems to parallel that portion of Roberts which admitted evidence fal-
ling within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception,”49 and indicates that 
such exceptions may fall outside of the Crawford analysis altogether.  
 Once “testimonial” is defined, the Court indicates a general 
framework to include such evidence at trial, but the framework’s ex-
act workings are far from clear. If testimonial hearsay is involved, 
the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant must have been 
available at some time. The opportunity for cross-examination is ob-
viously met when the witness/declarant appears at trial. If a wit-
ness/declarant does not appear at trial, the party offering his testi-
mony must show (1) the witness/declarant’s unavailability, and (2) 
there was an opportunity to cross-examine the witness/declarant 
prior to trial.50 Within this framework, the Court did make clear, 
however, that the use of prior testimonial statements is not con-
                                                                                                                    
 45. Id. at 1371. 
 46. See id. at 1364. The inclusion of statements made during police interrogations 
could prove to be significant. For instance, a prosecutor may not wish to call an ineffective 
witness. These statements could still be heard at trial under the Roberts framework by a 
showing of particular trustworthiness. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. Crawford indicates not 
only that unavailability will have to be proven for such statements to be admitted, but also 
that a prior opportunity to cross-examine—which is highly unlikely at the scene of a 
crime—must be shown. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364-65. 
 47. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1367. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
 50. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365. 
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strained at all as long as the declarant appears at trial for cross-
examination.51   
 The Court gave further indication that Roberts has not fully been 
discarded. The Court stated that where nontestimonial hearsay is 
involved, “it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to afford 
the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as does 
Roberts.”52 Thus, the lower courts may retain the Roberts framework 
to the extent that it is applied to nontestimonial evidence. 
 In spite of, and because of, the number of uncertainties that re-
main, Crawford will cast a considerable shadow on criminal trials for 
years to come as its ambiguities are explored and its implications are 
fully realized. 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW—CLEAN WATER ACT—UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT A POINT SOURCE NEED NOT BE THE 
ORIGINAL SOURCE OF POLLUTION TO SATISFY THE JURISDICTIONAL 
REQUIREMENT OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT—South Florida Water 
Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 124 S. Ct. 1537 
(2004). 
 The Clean Water Act53 was enacted in 1972 with the purpose of 
“restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters.”54 Contained in the Clean Water Act 
is the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), 
which is a permitting program for entities to legally discharge pol-
lutants into waters.55 In South Florida Water Management District v. 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,56 the United States Supreme Court held 
that a discharge of a pollutant from a point source under the Clean 
Water Act includes point sources that are not the original sources of 
the pollutants.57 The Court also vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s opin-
ion and remanded the case to the district court for argument on 
whether the water bodies in question were “unitary waters” or 
whether they were two separate and discrete entities.58 This decision 
might affect not only current NPDES regulations promulgated by the 
Environmental Protection Agency but also the number of permits 
that may need to be issued each year under the NPDES permitting 
program.59 
                                                                                                                    
 51. Id. at 1369 n.9. 
 52. Id. at 1374.  
 53. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). 
 54. Id. § 1251(a). 
 55. Id. § 1342(a). 
 56. 124 S. Ct. 1537 (2004). 
 57. Id. at 1543. 
 58. Id. at 1545. 
 59. See id. at 1544-45. 





 The Clean Water Act defines the term “discharge of a pollutant” 
as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point 
source.”60 Once it is determined that a pollutant is discharging into a 
navigable water, the next question is whether the pollutant origi-
nates from a point source or a nonpoint source, since the NPDES 
program only regulates point sources.61 The way in which courts de-
fine these terms determines whether individuals or companies are 
subject to the NPDES permitting program; that is, whether they 
need to apply for a permit in the first place.  
 The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians (“Tribe”) originally sued in the 
Southern District of Florida, alleging that the Clean Water Act’s 
NPDES program required the pumping facility, operated by the 
South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD), to obtain a 
permit.62 The pumping facility was the result of an Army Corps of 
Engineers (“Corps”) project, South Florida Flood Control, with the 
purpose of “flood protection, water conservation, and drainage.”63 At 
the end of a canal, C-11, a pump station, S-9, pumped water out of 
the canal and into the WCA-3, an undeveloped wetland.64 The water 
was prevented from returning to the canal by two levees, which also 
acted “artificially to separate the C-11 basin from the WCA-3.”65 Wa-
ter that collected on the C-11 side contained contaminants, including 
phosphorous, from agricultural and residential lands, and when it 
was pumped into the WCA-3, it altered the ecosystem of that wetland 
and in turn affected the Everglades.66 The question for the courts to 
decide was whether this addition of polluted water constituted an 
addition of a pollutant from a point source under the Clean Water 
Act’s NPDES program, thus requiring a permit.67  
 The case arrived before the Supreme Court after the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed a district court ruling that the two water bodies 
were distinct and the addition of already-polluted water to a naviga-
ble water was a point source, thereby requiring a permit to discharge 
from one to the other.68 Writing for an eight-justice majority, Justice 
O’Connor held that a point source could include a “conveyance” that 
                                                                                                                    
 60. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). 
 61. Id. Section 1362(14) defines “point source” as “any discernable, confined and dis-
crete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, . . . 
from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” Id. § 1362(14). 
 62. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. South Fla. Water Mgmt Dist., No. 98-6056-CIV, 
1999 WL 33494862, at *1, *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 1999), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 280 
F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 2002), vacated by 124 S. Ct. 1537 (2004). 
 63. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1540. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 1541. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. at 1541-42. 
 68. Id. at 1542. 
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is not the “original source of the pollutant.”69 The SFWMD had ar-
gued that a permit under the NPDES program was only needed 
when “a pollutant originates from the point source.”70 The Court dis-
agreed, observing that the specific language of the definition of a 
point source under § 1362(14) made obvious that a point source need 
only convey a pollutant into navigable waters.71 Furthermore, to but-
tress this interpretation, the Court observed that the NPDES pro-
gram was designed to regulate entities such as municipal wastewater 
treatment plants, which discharge waters polluted by individuals 
other than the treatment plants.72 The Court reasoned that the ar-
gument offered by SFWMD must be incorrect, because if the pollut-
ant must originate from the particular source that is discharging the 
waste or pollutant, then municipal wastewater facilities would also 
not be required to obtain a permit.73  
 Next, the Court addressed the SFWMD’s remaining two argu-
ments. The majority held that, on remand, the parties could argue a 
“unitary waters” approach;74 that is, whether a permit is needed to 
discharge unaltered water from one navigable water into the same 
unitary body of water.75 The Court noted that a decision on this ar-
gument would have significant practical effects; mainly, it would not 
require the SFWMD to obtain a permit if the C-11 and WCA-3 were 
considered unitary waters.76 However, since the argument was not 
raised in the lower court proceedings, the Court declined to decide 
this issue, leaving the issue open to decision on remand.77 Finally, a 
factual dispute remained as to whether the C-11 canal and the WCA-
3 were discrete water bodies.78 If the two were actually one water 
body, then a permit would not be needed because there would be no 
addition of a pollutant.79 However, the majority reasoned that there 
was not enough factual evidence in the record to determine this is-
                                                                                                                    
 69. Id. at 1543. 
 70. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).  
 71. See id. (noting the definition of point source includes pipes and conduits, which 
“do not themselves generate pollution”). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. Id. at 1545. 
 75. Id. at 1543-44. 
 76. Id. at 1544-45. The SFWMD also argued that rejecting the unitary water ap-
proach could wreak havoc upon many state regulatory programs due to the increased 
number of permits that would be required under such a ruling. See id. at 1545.  
 77. Id. at 1545. Justice Scalia disagreed as to the propriety of inviting the parties to 
make entirely new arguments upon remand. See id. at 1547 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. at 1545. 
 79. See id. (“‘[I]f one takes a ladle of soup from a pot, lifts it above the pot, and pours 
it back into the pot, one has not “added” soup or anything else to the pot.’” (quoting Catskill 
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. New York, 273 F.3d 481, 492 (2d Cir. 
2001))). 





sue80 and held that the test used by the district court for determining 
the issue was applied “prematurely” at the summary judgment stage, 
where there were issues of material fact to be resolved.81  
 Justice Scalia dissented in part and concurred in part. He joined 
the part of the opinion that held a point source was included in the 
NPDES program, even if the point source did not add the pollutants 
to the discharged water.82 However, Scalia would not have vacated 
the Eleventh Circuit’s decision and would not have remanded to dis-
cuss either the unitary waters issue or the discrete water bodies is-
sue because neither was a part of the question presented on certio-
rari.83 Furthermore, Justice Scalia noted other problems with the lat-
ter parts of the majority opinion. He argued that the SFWMD did not 
address the unitary waters approach in the court below; therefore, it 
should not be allowed to argue this approach on remand.84 Moreover, 
he indicated that the district court was not required on summary 
judgment to look at arguments that the parties themselves did not 
make.85 
 The Supreme Court’s decision continues a trend of refining the ju-
risdictional elements of the NPDES program. By holding that a pol-
lutant does not have to originate from the point source that is dis-
charging the pollutant, the Court has again delineated a more spe-
cific definition of an element that must be present in order for a 
NPDES permit to be required.86 However, the Court also continued a 
pattern of narrowing the scope of the definition of “navigable water.” 
When the Court decided United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 
Inc.,87 it stated that wetlands could be considered navigable waters if 
they are adjacent to and bound up with that water body’s hydrologic 
cycle.88 After that case was decided, the Environmental Protection 
Agency and Corps began to increase the amounts of permits required 
under the Clean Water Act,89 and in the view of some, the Clean Wa-
                                                                                                                    
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 1547 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. Scalia stated that although there may be a factual dispute as to whether, 
without the S-9 to pump the water to WCA-3, pollutants would still flow from the C-11 to 
WCA-3, that was not argued by the parties in the district court, and therefore the Court 
should not require a lower court to speculate as to all the possibilities for denying or grant-
ing summary judgment. See id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)).  
 86. See id. at 1543. In other cases, courts have more specifically defined the jurisdic-
tional elements of the NPDES permit program. See, e.g., United States v. Plaza Health 
Labs., 3 F.3d 643, 646-47, 649 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a person is not a point source as 
defined in the Clean Water Act). 
 87. 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
 88. Id. at 130-35. 
 89. Timothy S. Bishop et al., Counting the Hands on Borden Ranch, 34 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10040, 10040 (2004). 
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ter Act became a statute that regulated water and land use instead 
of a “law protecting the navigable waters.”90  
 Subsequently, in 2001, the Court decided Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers.91 
This case invalidated a Corps rule that allowed the Corps to assert 
jurisdiction over waters inhabited by migratory birds by holding that 
isolated wetlands are not “navigable waters” under the Clean Water 
Act.92 In Solid Waste Agency, the Supreme Court began to reduce 
what waters constituted navigable waters under the Clean Water 
Act; Miccosukee Tribe is another example of the Court limiting what 
waters fall under the definition of “navigable.” The Court, in allowing 
for the parties on remand to argue that a unitary waters approach 
should be used, or in the alternative that the C-11 canal and WCA-3 
are the same navigable water and not two distinct water bodies, is 
creating another limitation on the definition of navigable waters for 
permitting under the Clean Water Act. 
 In Miccosukee Tribe, the Court left open the unitary waters ques-
tion. If separate waters are each navigable, but part of the same sys-
tem, then transfer of water from one body to another would not con-
stitute an addition of a pollutant because the water is added and 
taken from the same water body. If, after remand, the Court consid-
ers the issue again and accepts the unitary waters approach, then 
certain transfers of pollutants between navigable waters would not 
require a permit under the NPDES program. This could affect state 
NPDES programs that do require permits for this type of pollutant 
discharge at present.93 On the other hand, if the Supreme Court does 
not recognize the unitary waters approach, then many facilities, such 
as the SFWMD’s facilities, will have to begin to comply with the 
NPDES permit standards for discharging pollutants. In the instant 
case, this is, of course, contingent on the undecided fact of whether 
the two water bodies in question are one water body or two discrete 
bodies of water.  
 Once the Supreme Court makes its ultimate decision with regard 
to the unitary waters issue, there will be a significant impact upon 
some states’ regulatory regimes.  For the time being, though, Micco-
sukee Tribe has not drastically altered the Clean Water Act permit-
ting landscape, though it does send a strong message about the next 
possible refinement to the Clean Water Act’s jurisdictional defini-
tions. Given the Court’s holding that ensures the parties will argue 
                                                                                                                    
 90. Id.  
 91. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 92. Id. at 167-69. 
 93. See Kenneth J. Warren, Water Quality and Water Quantity Management Collide, 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 15, 2004, at 9. Warren stated that certain programs, like the 
State of Pennsylvania program, that require permits for situations “where water is di-
verted from one body of water to another” would not be legal anymore. Id.  





“unitary waters” on remand, and given the Court’s recent holdings 
reducing the scope of the Clean Water Act’s threshold requirements, 
the ultimate adoption of a “unitary waters” definition seems to be the 
next logical step in the development of the Court’s Clean Water Act 
jurisprudence. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FIRST AMENDMENT—ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
USES BOTH PRIOR RESTRAINT AND CONTENT-BASED ANALYSES TO 
HOLD ST. JOHNS COUNTY SIGN ORDINANCE UNCONSTITUTIONAL—
Café Erotica v. St. Johns County, 360 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 The Supreme Court utilizes a prior restraint test to analyze li-
censing or permitting schemes affecting speech.94 This framework al-
lows courts to address the problems of content-based discrimination 
and censorship.95 The Eleventh Circuit has used this model to protect 
content-based “speech” relating to the adult entertainment industry. 
For example, in Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville,96 the 
Eleventh Circuit, using a prior restraint test, held the City of Jack-
sonville’s procedures for obtaining a zoning exception unconstitu-
tional as applied to adult entertainment establishments.97 Despite 
the obvious—that the ordinance was directed at a specific type of 
speech—the court rendered its holding without implementing a con-
tent-based discrimination analysis.98 Recently, in Café Erotica v. St. 
Johns County,99 the Eleventh Circuit again used prior restraint 
analysis, but this time also expressly injected a content-based dis-
crimination analysis to invalidate a St. Johns County (“County”) sign 
ordinance.100 The court held the sign ordinance operated as an un-
constitutional prior restraint on speech and discriminated against 
political speech by favoring commercial speech.101 
                                                                                                                    
 94. Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation? Protecting Religious Land Uses After 
Boerne, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 861, 906 (2000). 
 95. Id. 
 96. 176 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 97. Id. at 1361 (“[A]n exception [to the zoning ordinance is] the equivalent of a license. 
. . . [T]he indispensability of the zoning exception persuades us to treat it like a license as 
well.”). 
 98. The court recognized the interplay of prior restraint and content-based discrimi-
nation when it noted that the exceptions process “gives the zoning board discretion to delay 
a decision indefinitely or to covertly deny applications for content-sensitive reasons.” Id. at 
1363 (emphasis added). 
 99. 360 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 100. The parties challenging the ordinance were associated with the adult entertain-
ment industry. The parties, Café Erotica of Florida, Inc. (“Café Erotica” or “Café”) and Café 
Erotica/We Dare to Bare/Adult Toys/Great Food/Exit 94, Inc. (“We Dare to Bare”), were 
both incorporated by Jerry Sullivan. Id. Mr. Sullivan also served as president of each cor-
poration. Id. at 1278 n.2. 
 101. Id. at 1292. 
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 The appeal consolidated two cases.102 The first case involved an 
adult entertainment establishment, Café Erotica of Florida, Inc., 
(“Café Erotica” or “Café”), located in St. Johns County.103 Café Erotica 
was issued citations for, among other things, erecting “political mes-
sage banners”104 without obtaining a permit.105 The second case, 
brought by Café Erotica/We Dare to Bare/Adult Toys/Great Food/Exit 
94, Inc. (“We Dare to Bare”), involved facial and as-applied chal-
lenges with respect to a billboard along Interstate 95.106 We Dare to 
Bare argued that the County delayed its billboard-licensing decision 
and imposed additional requirements not placed on similar busi-
nesses.107 The district courts granted summary judgment in favor of 
the plaintiffs and permanently enjoined enforcement of the ordi-
nance.108 
 The ordinance required a permit for any sign larger than fifteen 
square feet.109 The ordinance categorized signs differently; categories 
relevant to the appeal included billboard, on-premise, and special use 
signs.110 Billboards could be as large as 378 square feet, or 560 square 
feet if adjacent to the interstate.111 The ordinance defined billboards 
as off-premise signs over thirty-two square feet and on-premise signs 
exceeding 300 square feet used for “advertising.”112 On-premise signs 
were limited to 150 square feet, or 300 square feet if adjacent to the 
interstate.113 “Political message signs,” which required a permit, were 
included in the special use category.114 These were defined as “not 
containing a commercial message” and were limited to thirty-two 
                                                                                                                    
 102. Id. at 1277. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Censorship toward the appellees may be implicated when one considers the mes-
sage of two banners. One read, “Karen Bruner [who issued the citations] is An Incompetent 
County Official;” and another read, “James Acosta [Supervisor of Code Enforcement for the 
County] is a fat ass Barney Fife. He has cost the county thousands of $ in lost lawsuits for 
using selective [e]nforcements.” Id. at 1277 n.1. 
 105. Id. at 1277. 
 106. Id. at 1278. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1279. The County had fourteen days to approve or deny an application. Id. 
However, if the County required more information, the fourteen-day period did not com-
mence until receipt of the additional information. Id. Any decision was appealable to the 
Board of County Commissioners within thirty days of the decision. The Board then had fif-
teen days to render a decision. Id. at 1280. Finally, the Board’s decision could be appealed 
to the circuit court within a thirty-day period. Id. The district court decision indicated that 
these requirements could permit the County Administrator to delay the permitting proc-
ess. Id. at 1283. The County amended this section to provide the County Administrator 
thirty days to approve or deny an application. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1280. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. “Advertising” encompassed both commercial and political speech. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 1281. 





square feet, while commercial billboards and signs could reach 560 
square feet.115 
 The court addressed two facial challenges asserted by appellees: 
(1) the ordinance was a content-based restriction favoring commer-
cial over political speech, and (2) the ordinance’s permitting require-
ments operated as an unconstitutional prior restraint of speech un-
der the test established by the Supreme Court in FW/PBS, Inc. v. 
City of Dallas.116  
 The court began by illustrating that, for this licensing scheme, 
prior restraint analysis provided it with an avenue to address con-
tent-based discrimination.117 The court concluded that the licensing 
process operated as a prior restraint because, in order for expressive 
speech—erecting a billboard—to occur, a permit must be issued.118 
Thus, for the permitting process to stand, the County’s decision had 
to pass a prior restraint test.119 Two criteria must be satisfied under 
this test: (1) the County’s decision must be made within a specific 
time period, and (2) government officials must not have “unbridled 
discretion.”120 
 The court hearkened back to Lady J. Lingerie to deconstruct the 
first prong into two sub-prongs: (1) the permitting decision must be 
prompt, and (2) there must be prompt judicial review.121 The first 
sub-prong was fulfilled because the decision was approved or denied 
within thirty days.122 Likewise, the second sub-prong was fulfilled be-
cause the decision could be appealed in the circuit court within thirty 
days.123 
 The court then rejected the County’s contention that the 
“[o]rdinance does not give the County Administrator discretion to re-
ject a sign based on its content because the sign applicant need not 
disclose the sign’s message.”124 The court’s concern was that the ordi-
nance contained “no explicit limits on the County Administrator’s 
                                                                                                                    
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 1279 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990)). 
 117. Id. at 1282 (“We start with prior restraint analysis because our holding in this 
section highlights the potential for content-based decisionmaking . . . .”). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1283 (citing Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358, 
1362-63 (11th Cir. 1999)). 
 122. Id. The thirty-day period amended the fourteen-day approval period which could 
be restarted by the County requesting more information. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 1284. Censorship is again implicated because the County, while not know-
ing what the message was, would know who was applying for the permit. During oral ar-
gument, Judge Wilson made this precise point. Telephone Interview with Gary S. Edinger, 
Esq., Counsel for Café Erotica and We Dare to Bare (May 14, 2004). 
294  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:279 
 
  
discretion.”125 Thus, without specific criteria to guide the Administra-
tor, the permitting process was facially unconstitutional.126 
 The court then addressed whether treating commercial and politi-
cal billboards in a different manner constituted unconstitutional con-
tent-based discrimination. Billboard regulations are controlled by 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego.127 Under Metromedia, the first 
issue was whether the ordinance was a valid, content-neutral time, 
place and manner restriction.128 If the regulation was not based on 
the content of the speech, was narrowly tailored to serve a “signifi-
cant” government interest, and allowed alternative channels to com-
municate the information, it would be deemed constitutional.129 How-
ever, if the regulation was content-based, the County had to demon-
strate that the regulation was narrowly tailored to serve a “compel-
ling” governmental interest.130 Consistent with Metromedia, the court 
found the regulation was content-based because it discriminated in 
favor of commercial messages over political messages.131 The inquiry 
then became whether the ordinance “in fact” favored commercial 
messages over political messages.132 
 The County argued that the ordinance did not favor commercial 
speech because “any speech, including political messages, can be 
placed on billboards.”133 The court rejected this argument, giving four 
reasons.134 First, the County’s position ignored that “political mes-
sage signs” were limited to thirty-two square feet—if commercial and 
political messages were intended to be on “equal footing,” the signs 
would not be regulated separately.135 Second, “political message 
signs” were limited to thirty-two square feet—there was no exception 
for “political message billboards.”136 Therefore, political messages 
could not enjoy the same 378-square-foot allowance that commercial 
billboards were permitted.137 Third, the ordinance required all bill-
boards to display the owner’s name. The court held that this re-
quirement may make sense for commercial messages; however, it 
would require “a sign displaying the message ‘Vote for John Smith’ 
[to also] include the words ‘Café Erotica / We Dare to Bare / Adult 
                                                                                                                    
 125. Café Erotica, 360 F.3d at 1284. 
 126. Id. 
 127. 453 U.S. 490 (1981). 
 128. Café Erotica, 360 F.3d at 1285. 
 129. Id. at 1286. 
 130. Id. at 1287. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1287-89. 
 135. Id. at 1287-88. 
 136. Id. at 1288. 
 137. Id. 





Toys / Great Food / Exit 94, Inc.’ in similar bold print.”138 This was in-
consistent with a Supreme Court decision holding that “‘an author’s 
decision to remain anonymous . . . is an aspect of freedom of speech 
protected by the First Amendment.’”139 Finally, the County Adminis-
trator had the unbridled power to discriminate between political and 
commercial messages because the Administrator could limit mes-
sages the County disagrees with to thirty-two feet by labeling the 
message “political.”140 Conversely, the Administrator could allow 
other “political messages” the County agrees with to be placed on 
billboards by labeling the message “commercial.”141 
 Once the court determined that the ordinance “in fact” discrimi-
nated based on content, it turned to Metromedia to determine 
whether the regulations could pass strict scrutiny by illustrating rea-
sons narrowly tailored to further compelling government interests.142 
The Metromedia Court struck down a portion of a San Diego ordi-
nance that prevented certain billboards from displaying political 
messages.143 The ordinance allowed on-site commercial billboards, 
but almost completely banned similar noncommercial signs.144 The 
Café Erotica court found the same preference within the County’s or-
dinance “in the form of greater size restrictions for noncommercial 
messages vis-à-vis commercial ones” and held that the ordinance 
must be held facially unconstitutional unless it could satisfy strict 
scrutiny, which could be accomplished by enunciating reasons the 
ordinance was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest.145 
 The County’s reasons were “to protect the safety and aesthetic in-
terests of its citizens.”146 The court agreed that the goals were sub-
stantial and that limiting the size of all signs might be justified, but 
allowing commercial billboards to reach 560 square feet and political 
message signs to reach a maximum of only thirty-two feet could 
not.147 The ordinance contained no findings of fact illustrating how 
political message signs are more hazardous or more visually dis-
pleasing than commercial signs.148 The court held “[t]he County can 
achieve its goals simply by mandating that all messages, whether po-
litical or commercial, be limited to the same size.”149 
                                                                                                                    
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995)). 
 140. Id. at 1288-89. 
 141. Id. at 1289. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). 
 144. Id. at 512. 
 145. Café Erotica, 360 F.3d at 1291. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 1292. 
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 In short, the court found that the ordinance lacked specific guide-
lines to limit the County Administrator’s discretion and that the or-
dinance unconstitutionally favored commercial messages over politi-
cal messages.150 Thus, the ordinance was facially unconstitutional, 
making the issue of whether the ordinance was unconstitutional as 
applied to the appellees unnecessary to decide.151 
 Judge Kravitch, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed 
with the legal framework implemented by the court but disagreed 
with its application to the facts.152 Judge Kravitch agreed that the 
County impermissibly distinguished between commercial and non-
commercial speech, but disagreed that this presented a prior re-
straint issue.153 He argued that the criteria, regulating the number, 
size, and construction of signs, were sufficient and that the court had 
held similar regulations permissible.154 Finally, Judge Kravitch ar-
gued that “[t]he most natural reading of the ordinance” was contrary 
to the majority’s interpretation—he interpreted the ordinance as al-
lowing billboards up to 560 square feet to contain political or com-
mercial messages.155  
 Café Erotica is consistent with the law of other jurisdictions that 
have used prior restraint analysis to provide a tool for addressing 
content-based discrimination.156 The facts of this case gave the court 
the opportunity not only to “highlight” the potential for content-
based decisionmaking, but also to specifically initiate and apply a 
content inquiry. Recently, the court denied the County’s petition for 
en banc review. The County could petition the Supreme Court; how-
ever, the Eleventh Circuit’s holding does not seem to depart from 
other jurisdictions adjudicating prior restraint and content-based 
cases. The County is again in the process of amending its ordinance. 
Only time will tell if the County implements criteria limiting the 
County Administrator’s discretion and utilizes other methods—less 
obvious than expressly differentiating between commercial and po-
litical messages—to discriminate against content-based speech. For 
                                                                                                                    
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 1293. 
 152. Id. (Kravitch, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 1293-94; see also Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of St. Peters-
burg, 348 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 155. Café Erotica, 360 F.3d at 1295. 
 156. See Nightclubs, Inc. v. City of Paducah, 202 F.3d 884, 890-93 (6th Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing a licensing scheme for sexually oriented businesses lacked procedural safeguards and 
operated as a prior restraint); Baby Tam & Co. v. City of Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097, 1101-
02 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating where all bookstores were required to obtain a permit before op-
erating, the permitting process operated as a prior restraint without prompt judicial re-
view); Genusa v. City of Peoria, 619 F.2d 1203, 1214-17 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding a licensing 
provision for sexually oriented businesses gave city officials unbridled discretion to impose 
a prior restraint on free speech). 





now, Café Erotica and We Dare to Bare enjoy the protection of a per-
manent injunction against enforcement of the unconstitutional ordi-
nance. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—DUE PROCESS—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT 
HOLDS THAT DESTRUCTION OF CITRUS TREES PURSUANT TO THE 
CITRUS CANKER LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS—Haire v. 
Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 870 So. 
2d 774 (Fla. 2004). 
 Recently, in Haire v. Florida Department of Agriculture and Con-
sumer Services,157 the Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of Florida’s Citrus Canker Law.158 This Note briefly explains 
citrus canker and Florida’s Citrus Canker Law, then discusses the 
court’s application of precedent and the Citrus Canker Law to the 
facts of Haire, and concludes with a brief discussion of one implica-
tion of the court’s decision.  
 Citrus canker is a bacterial disease that causes significant dam-
age to the leaves, stems, and fruits of citrus trees.159 Unlike other 
diseases that damage Florida’s citrus crop,160 citrus canker is readily 
transferred from tree to tree via wind-driven rain and contaminated 
equipment and plant material.161 Because of its high transferability 
rate, scientists estimate that, if left unabated, citrus canker would 
decimate Florida’s fresh citrus industry and possibly lead to a federal 
ban on Florida’s citrus crop.162 Thus, since its discovery in 1914,163 ef-
forts have been made to eradicate citrus canker.  
 One such effort is Florida’s Citrus Canker Law, which authorizes 
the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (“Depart-
ment”) to remove and destroy trees infected with and exposed to cit-
rus canker.164 The Department may obtain a search warrant165 for 
property that it has probable cause to believe harbors trees infected 
with citrus canker and issue an immediate and final order (“IFO”) 
requiring all infected and exposed trees discovered on the property to 
be removed and destroyed within ten days of the property owner’s re-
                                                                                                                    
 157. 870 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2004). 
 158. FLA. STAT. § 581.184 (2003). 
 159. Haire, 870 So. 2d at 778.  
 160. “Spreading decline” is one example of a slow-spreading disease that damages cit-
rus trees. Id. at 784. 
 161. Id. at 778.  
 162. See Fla. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. City of Pompano Beach, 792 So. 2d 
539, 542 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).  
 163. Haire, 870 So. 2d at 778. 
 164. FLA. STAT. § 581.184 (2003).  
 165. Haire, 870 So. 2d at 788-89 (clarifying that a single search warrant may be issued 
for multiple properties where the Department has probable cause to search each property 
and describes each property with particularity in its application for a search warrant). 
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ceipt of the IFO.166 Additionally, the Florida Legislature has enacted 
a compensation scheme167 to reimburse owners whose trees are de-
stroyed pursuant to the Citrus Canker Law. The petitioners in Haire 
challenged the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s ruling that neither 
the compensation scheme nor the summary destruction of trees pro-
vided by the Citrus Canker Law violates due process.168  
 The Florida Supreme Court upheld the Fourth District’s deci-
sion.169 Writing for the majority,170 Justice Pariente emphasized the 
state’s ability to deprive citizens of private property via regulation, 
such as the Citrus Canker Law, pursuant to its police power,171 and 
the court subdivided the due process concerns raised by the petition-
ers as a result of the state’s destruction of their property into sub-
stantive172 and procedural173 due process inquiries. This Note dis-
cusses the court’s analysis of substantive due process first, then fol-
lows with a discussion of the court’s analysis of procedural due proc-
ess. 
 The court held that the “reasonable relationship” test was the 
proper standard of review for determining whether the Citrus Can-
ker Law violated substantive due process.174 Relying on precedent, 
the court reasoned that the Citrus Canker Law is rationally related 
to the Legislature’s legitimate goal of eradicating citrus canker be-
cause it provides a method for preventing further spread of the dis-
ease.175 
                                                                                                                    
 166. FLA. STAT. § 581.184(2)(a).  
 167. Id. § 581.1845.  
 168. Haire, 870 So. 2d at 777-78. The petitioners also challenged the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal’s decision that a single search warrant can provide for the search of multi-
ple properties and that the search warrant can be electronically signed. Id.  
 169. Id. at 790. The court also upheld the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s ruling that 
a single search warrant can include multiple properties where probable cause exists to 
search each property and each property is described with particularity. Id. at 788-89. Addi-
tionally, the court upheld the Fourth District’s ruling that search warrants could be signed 
electronically. Id. at 789-90. However, the Court did not address the Fourth District’s de-
termination that section 933.07(2), Florida Statutes, which permits county-wide searches, 
is unconstitutional because that ruling was not appealed. Id. at 777-78. 
 170. Justices Wells and Bell concurred in the result only. Id. at 790. 
 171. Id. at 781.  
 172. “Substantive due process protects ‘the full panoply of individual rights from un-
warranted encroachment by the government.’” Id. (quoting Dep’t of Law Enforcement v. 
Real Prop., 588 So. 2d 957, 960 (Fla. 1991)).  
 173. “‘Procedural due process serves as a vehicle to ensure fair treatment through 
proper administration of justice where substantive rights are at issue.’” Id. at 787 (quoting 
Dep’t of Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 960).  
 174. Id. at 782.  
 175. The court cited Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services v. Mid-Florida 
Growers, Inc., 521 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1988), and Johnson v. State ex rel. Maxcy, 128 So. 853 
(1930), to support its holding that eradication of citrus canker is a legitimate legislative 
goal and destruction of exposed trees is rationally related to this goal. Haire, 870 So. 2d at 
783. 





 Furthermore, the court rejected the petitioners’ argument that 
section 581.1845, Florida Statutes, prevents property owners from 
obtaining just compensation for destroyed trees.176 The court noted 
that it is the judiciary’s role to determine what constitutes just com-
pensation, and the Legislature cannot enact a statute that sets the 
maximum amount of compensation a property owner can receive.177 
However, the court distinguished the statute at issue in Haire from a 
previous statute that unconstitutionally set the maximum amount of 
compensation a property owner could receive178 and held that the 
compensation scheme at issue in Haire merely sets a compensation 
floor that establishes the minimum amount of compensation an 
owner can receive.179 Thus, the court held that the Citrus Canker 
Law allows for just compensation because it does not preclude a 
property owner from petitioning the courts for compensation in ex-
cess of that provided by the statute.180  
 In addition to finding that the Citrus Canker Law does not violate 
substantive due process, the court held that the summary destruc-
tion of trees following an IFO by the Department is not a violation of 
procedural due process.181 In so deciding, the court distinguished the 
facts of Haire from its previous decision in State Plant Board v. 
Smith,182 where the court held that summary destruction of trees in-
fected with spreading decline183 was a violation of procedural due 
process, because that disease did not pose an imminent danger of 
spread.184 Conversely, the court noted the imminent danger of spread 
inherent in citrus canker and held that, despite the petitioners’ claim 
that summary destruction precludes an opportunity to be heard, the 
high transferability rate of citrus canker necessitates summary de-
struction; therefore, the Citrus Canker Law does not violate proce-
dural due process.185  
 While courts have historically supported a legislature’s use of its 
police power to serve the needs of the many at the expense of the 
needs of the few,186 the legislature’s method for compensating prop-
                                                                                                                    
 176. Haire, 870 So. 2d at 785.  
 177. Id. 
 178. See State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401, 406-07 (Fla. 1959) (holding unconsti-
tutional a statute that mandated that compensation for destroyed trees not exceed $1000 
per acre). 
 179. Haire, 870 So. 2d at 785.  
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 787-88.  
 182. 110 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1959).  
 183. Id. at 409; see also supra note 160.  
 184. Haire, 870 So. 2d at 787-88.  
 185. Id. at 788. 
 186. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928) (stating one of the distin-
guishing characteristics of the police power is the preference of the public interest “over the 
property interest of the individual”).  
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erty owners who suffer the loss of their trees pursuant to Florida’s 
Citrus Canker Law may seem, at first glance, to violate due process 
by precluding just compensation. However, the court’s decision in 
Haire provides reassurance for property owners whose trees are de-
stroyed in the effort to eradicate citrus canker that the judiciary has 
the final word as to what constitutes just compensation.  
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT—FLORIDA 
SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT A PROSECUTOR’S COMMENTS MUST BE 
EVALUATED WITHIN THE ENTIRE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE COMMENTS 
ARE MADE—State v. Jones, 867 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2004). 
 A defendant has the constitutional right to decline to testify 
against himself in a criminal proceeding.187 This right has been ex-
panded to incorporate not only the right to refuse to testify but also 
the right to prevent a prosecutor from making any improper com-
ment regarding the defendant’s failure to testify.188 However, it is not 
always clear when this right has been violated, and the Florida 
courts have been left with the difficult task of determining when the 
prosecutor has crossed the line. The test for determining whether a 
comment is improper is whether the comment is “fairly susceptible of 
being interpreted by the jury as a comment on the defendant’s failure 
to testify.”189 Recently, the Florida Supreme Court addressed this is-
sue in State v. Jones190 and expanded the test to require that the 
questionable statement be evaluated in the context in which it was 
made and not as an isolated comment.191  
 Determining whether a statement is “fairly susceptible of being 
interpreted by the jury as a comment on the defendant’s failure to 
testify” is not an easy task, and Florida courts have struggled with 
trying to draw the fine line between permissible and impermissible 
comments. The question often turns on whether the prosecutor in-
tended for the comment to be directed at the defendant’s failure to 
testify or whether there was another plausible explanation for the 
statement.192 However, comments may be interpreted differently de-
pending on whether they are evaluated as isolated comments or 
whether the entire context in which the comment was made is taken 
into consideration.193   
                                                                                                                    
 187. The Fifth Amendment provides: “No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Florida Constitution 
guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness 
against oneself.” FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
 188. See Caballero v. State, 851 So. 2d 655, 660 (Fla. 2003). 
 189. Miller v. State, 847 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). 
 190. 867 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2004). 
 191. Id. at 400. 
 192. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 438 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1983). 
 193. See Jones, 867 So. 2d at 400. 





 The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Jones put an end 
to the inconsistency among the lower courts by creating a rule that a 
prosecutor’s comment is to be examined within the entire context in 
which it was made.194 In the case, Allister Jones was charged with 
the lewd assault upon, and false imprisonment of, a child under the 
age of thirteen.195 During his trial, the prosecutor made the following 
comment during the closing argument: 
The State of Florida has proven this case beyond a reasonable 
doubt and I ask you to go back in that jury room, apply your com-
mon sense to the true facts of this case and come back and tell the 
defendant what he knows sitting there today, that he is guilty of 
indecent assault.196 
Jones objected to the prosecutor’s remark, “what the defendant 
knows sitting there today,” as being an improper comment on his re-
fusal to testify.197 The trial court overruled the objection; the jury 
found Jones guilty and sentenced him to a fifteen-year imprison-
ment.198 
 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed this decision and 
found that the prosecutor’s remarks violated Jones’s right to remain 
silent.199 The court held that “[b]y both referring to him as ‘sitting 
there’ and instructing the jury to ‘tell him what he already knows,’ 
the state suggested that Jones did not testify because he knew he 
was guilty.”200  
 In its decision, the Fourth District rejected the suggestion that the 
Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. State was controlling 
authority and instead distinguished the case based upon its facts.201 
In Harris, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder, bur-
glary with an assault, and robbery.202 During the trial, the officers 
who had interrogated Harris were called as witnesses and offered 
testimony that, during his interrogation, Harris was calm and had 
denied his involvement in the crimes, and it was not until several 
hours later that Harris confessed.203 The prosecutor made the follow-
ing statement in his closing argument: “I submit to you this was a 
voluntary statement taken after a considerable period of time in 
which he sat there and remained the same immobile, unemotional 
                                                                                                                    
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 399. 
 196. Id.  
 197. Id.  
 198. Id.  
 199. Jones v. State, 821 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), quashed by 867 So. 2d 398 
(Fla. 2004). 
 200. Id. at 474. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Harris v. State, 438 So. 2d 787, 789 (Fla. 1983). 
 203. Id. at 790. 
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self as he has this entire trial.”204 The Florida Supreme Court held 
that when the comment was considered within the context of the en-
tire closing argument, “[i]t is obvious that the prosecutor was de-
scribing to the jury the appellant’s demeanor during his interroga-
tion by comparing it to appellant’s demeanor as he appeared before 
them at the trial.”205  
 The Fourth District found the instant comment distinguishable 
from the comment in Harris because, in Jones, “the prosecutor was 
referring to what Jones[] knew as he was ‘sitting there,’ i.e., at trial, 
and not how he may have acted, or what he may have said, at an-
other time.”206 The Fourth District found the “comment certainly was 
‘fairly susceptible’ of being interpreted by the jury as a comment on 
Jones’s exercise of his right to remain silent.”207 
 Judge May dissented and stated in his opinion that the majority 
was incorrect in its finding that the statement in Harris was distin-
guishable because it “focused on the defendant’s demeanor at the 
time of the confession” and not on the defendant’s demeanor during 
the trial.208 Judge May argued that this was not a proper basis to 
draw a distinction; there was no difference between a comment fo-
cused on the defendant’s demeanor at the time of the trial and a 
comment focused on the defendant’s demeanor at the time of the con-
fession.209 According to Judge May, both comments should be evalu-
ated in the same manner.210  
 The Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the Fourth District 
and its interpretation of the holding in Harris.211 The Court held that 
whether a comment is proper or improper does not depend on 
whether the remark focuses on the defendant’s demeanor at the time 
of his confession and not his demeanor during the trial; rather, Har-
ris requires the courts to evaluate comments within the entire con-
text of the argument and not as isolated comments.212 By isolating 
the comment, the Fourth District could not appreciate the signifi-
cance of the comment.213 When the controversial phrase in Jones is 
read within the context of the entire argument, “it is clear that the 
statement amounts to nothing more than a point of reference.”214  
                                                                                                                    
 204. Id. at 794. 
 205. Id. at 795. 
 206. Jones, 821 So. 2d at 475. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 476 (May, J., dissenting). 
 209. Id.  
 210. Id.  
 211. State v. Jones, 867 So. 2d 398, 400 (Fla. 2004). 
 212. Id.  
 213. See id.  
 214. Id. 





 In its decision, the Florida Supreme Court evaluated Florida cases 
in which the closing remarks were found to have violated the defen-
dant’s right to remain silent.215 In its analysis of these cases, the 
court noted that the comments all referred to the respondent “sitting 
there” during the entire trial, whereas the comment in State v. Jones 
merely referred to the defendant “sitting there” as the prosecutor 
made his closing argument.216 In conclusion, the Florida Supreme 
Court found that the comment was not an improper comment on 
Jones’s exercise of his right to remain silent but rather was simply a 
reference to Jones’s physical position in the courtroom.217  
 Justice Wells wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing with Justice 
May’s dissent in the Fourth District’s decision that there was no dis-
tinction between the comment made in Harris and the one made in 
Jones.218 Chief Justice Anstead dissented from the majority opinion 
and argued that Harris was distinguishable because the prosecutor’s 
objective in making the statement was different in each of these 
cases.219 Because the cases were both factually specific, Chief Justice 
Anstead stated that “we will add little to the law by providing an-
other layer of review. The majority opinion is not announcing a broad 
rule of law, but instead has us serving as a second appellate court, 
which is not the function of this Court.”220 
 The decision of the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Jones re-
quires courts to look at the entire context of the questionable com-
ment, looking beyond the comment’s text. This rule calls for a new 
analysis from courts that previously evaluated the comments on 
their own, rather than within a larger context. Ideally, this require-
ment will lead to more accurate determinations of whether the com-
ment was focused on the defendant’s failure to testify or was actually 
being offered for another purpose by providing a broader view of 
what exactly the prosecutor was trying to get across to the jury. 
 However, this decision leaves several questions unanswered. 
First, the court does not describe what constitutes the entire context; 
that is, how much of the prosecutor’s testimony the court should re-
view, and who determines which parts of the trial are relevant as the 
“context” of the statement. Second, the court also glosses over the 
distinction between comments directed at a defendant “sitting there” 
at the time of the comment and those describing the defendant “sit-
ting there” throughout the trial.221 The court suggests that if the 
prosecutor refers to the defendant as “sitting there” during the entire 
                                                                                                                    
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 401 (Wells, J., concurring). 
 219. Id. at 402 (Anstead, C.J., dissenting). 
 220. Id. 
 221. See id. at 400. 
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trial, then this is a violation of the defendant’s right to remain si-
lent.222 However, if the prosecutor simply refers to the defendant’s 
presence as “sitting there” during the prosecutor’s comment, then 
this is a point of reference and not an attack on the defendant’s 
choice not to testify.223 The court does not state directly whether 
there is a distinction, but nonetheless, a distinction can be inferred 
from the context of the opinion; at this time, it is unclear if the court 
intended to make this distinction.  
CIVIL PROCEDURE—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT 
UNELABORATED ORDERS DENYING RELIEF IN CONNECTION WITH AN 
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT PETITION ARE NOT DECISIONS ON THE MERITS 
WHICH WOULD LATER BAR THE LITIGANT FROM PRESENTING THE 
ISSUE UNDER THE DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL 
ESTOPPEL—Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2004). 
 Florida courts have consistently held that for an action to be 
barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel,224 the decision must 
have been made “on the merits.”225 However, until the Florida Su-
preme Court’s recent decision in Topps v. State, Florida case law was 
in conflict with respect to whether an unelaborated order denying re-
lief of an extraordinary writ226 petition was to be considered a deci-
sion on the merits.227 
 In the First, Second, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal, an un-
elaborated denial of a petition for a writ of prohibition was not con-
sidered a ruling on the merits.228 Conversely, the Third and Fourth 
District Courts of Appeal held that an unelaborated order denying a 
petition for a writ of prohibition was to be regarded as a ruling on the 
merits.229  
                                                                                                                    
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Res judicata and collateral estoppel are related but different concepts. See discus-
sion infra notes 240-48 and accompanying text.  
 225. See Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 2004). 
 226. An extraordinary writ is one which is “issued by a court exercising unusual or dis-
cretionary power.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1602 (7th ed. 1999). Examples include writs 
of certiorari, habeas corpus, mandamus, and prohibition. Id. 
 227. Topps, 865 So. 2d at 1256. 
 228. See Smith v. State, 738 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Sumner v. Sumner, 707 
So. 2d 934 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); State Dep’t of Envtl. Reg. v. Falls Chase Special Taxing 
Dist., 424 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).  
 229. See Hobbs v. State, 689 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), overruled by Topps v. 
State, 865 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2004); Obanion v. State, 496 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), 
overruled by Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2004). The Third and Fourth Districts 
did not, however, consider all unelaborated denials of extraordinary writ petitions to be de-
cisions on the merits. For instance, in Hobbs the court differentiated between a petition for 
certiorari and a petition for prohibition:  
[D]enying certiorari without opinion is not the same as denying prohibition 
without opinion. 





 The Florida Supreme Court first attempted to address this conflict 
in 1998 by proposing an amendment to Rule 9.100 of the Florida 
Rules of Appellate Procedure.230 Under the proposed amendment, an 
unelaborated denial would have been deemed a decision on the mer-
its.231 However, the Florida Bar’s Appellate Court Rules Committee 
reversed the Florida Supreme Court’s proposal and submitted the 
court with an amendment that would not consider an unelaborated 
denial of an extraordinary writ petition to be a decision on the mer-
its.232 At that time the court rejected the committee’s proposal, de-
termining that the better approach would be to wait until the proper 
case was before them in order to remedy the lack of uniformity.233 
Topps presented the court with the appropriate case to address the 
problem.  
 In June of 2001, Martha Topps filed a petition for a writ of man-
damus in the Florida Supreme Court challenging the Stop Turning 
Out Prisoners Act, which required inmates to serve eighty-five per-
cent of their sentences in prison.234 The Act limited the amount of 
gain time that could be used by an inmate to reduce the amount of 
time that they actually spent in prison.235 Topps alleged that the Leg-
islature should not have been permitted to accomplish this by pass-
ing a law, but rather should have utilized the mechanism of a consti-
tutional amendment.236 The Florida Supreme Court considered 
Topps’ arguments and found them to be without merit.237 However, 
the court denied the petition by issuing an unelaborated order deny-
ing relief.238 Topps subsequently filed another petition for a writ of 
mandamus asserting the same issue.239  
                                                                                                                    
 On a petition for certiorari, no matter how clear the error of a trial judge may 
be, we do not have jurisdiction so long as the petitioner has an adequate rem-
edy on appeal. The vast majority of petitions for certiorari are dismissed be-
cause there is an adequate remedy on appeal. There is no similar jurisdictional 
hurdle, separate and apart from the propriety of the action of the trial court, 
when an appellate court reviews a petition for writ of prohibition. 
Hobbs, 689 So. 2d at 1250 (footnote omitted). 
 230. Topps, 856 So. 2d at 1256. Rule 9.100 establishes the procedures for processing 
writ petitions filed in appellate courts. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. In 1999 the court declined to adopt its proposed amendments to Rule 9.100. Id. 
at 1257 n.4.  
 234. Id. at 1254.  
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. The Florida Supreme Court subsequently addressed the Stop Turning Prison-
ers Out Act in Comer v. Moore “and held that it did not violate the single subject require-
ment of Florida’s Constitution.” Id. at 1254 n.1 (citing Comer v. Moore, 817 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 
2002)).  
 239. Id. 
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 The issue before the court was whether the denial of Topps’ prior 
petition acted as a procedural bar to the current action. More specifi-
cally, the court addressed whether Topps’ subsequent petition was 
barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. Res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel are related but different concepts.240 Res judicata is a 
doctrine that bars relitigation in a subsequent cause of action for 
claims that were raised and claims that could have been raised.241 In 
Florida, “res judicata applies when four identities are present: (1) 
identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) 
identity of persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the 
quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made.”242 The 
doctrine of collateral estoppel in Florida “bars relitigation of the 
same issues between the same parties in connection with a different 
cause of action.”243 For these two doctrines to have effect, the ruling 
must have been made on the merits.244 The court noted that in most 
cases where it denied an extraordinary writ petition on the merits it 
indicated so in the order by stating the denial is “on the merits” or 
“with prejudice,” or “without prejudice.”245 The petition in Topps’ pre-
vious case was denied without such an indication.246 However, the 
                                                                                                                    
 240. Professors Wright and Kane have said the following regarding the common prac-
tice of using res judicata to refer to all doctrines in which one judgment will have binding 
effect on another:  
“Res Judicata” has been used . . . as a general term referring to all of the ways 
in which one judgment will have a binding effect on another. That usage is and 
doubtless will continue to be common, but it lumps under a single name two 
quite different effects of judgments. The first is the effect of foreclosing any liti-
gation of matters that never have been litigated, because of the determination 
that they should have been advanced in an earlier suit. The second is the effect 
of foreclosing relitigation of matters that have once been litigated and decided. 
The first of these, preclusion of matters that were never litigated, has gone un-
der the name, “true res judicata,” or the names, “merger” and “bar.” The second 
doctrine, preclusion of matters that have once been decided, has usually been 
called “collateral estoppel.” [Some commentators have] long argued for [the] use 
of the names “claim preclusion” and “issue preclusion” for these two doctrines, 
and this usage is increasingly employed by the courts as it is by Restatement 
Second of Judgments. 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 100A, at 726 (6th 
ed. 2002) (footnotes omitted). 
 241. Topps, 865 So. 2d at 1255. Res judicata translated from Latin means “a thing ad-
judicated.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1312 (7th ed. 1999).  
 242. Topps, 865 So. 2d at 1255. 
 243. Id. For another explanation, see Gordon v. Gordon:  
[T]he principle of estoppel by judgment is applicable where the two causes of 
action are different, in which case the judgment in the first suit only estops the 
parties from litigating in the second suit issues—that is to say points and ques-
tions—common to both causes of action and which were actually adjudicated in 
the prior litigation. 
59 So. 2d 40, 44 (Fla. 1952). 
 244. Topps, 865 So. 2d at 1255. 
 245. Id. at 1257.  
 246. Id. 





court stated that in that case it intended the denial to be on the mer-
its.247 Because Topps’ original petition was denied on the merits and 
because the four identities were present between the original petition 
and the current petition, the court held that Topps’ claim was barred 
by res judicata.248  
 In making the distinction between the unelaborated denial and 
the elaborated denial, the court sought to resolve the conflict between 
the district courts of appeal in Florida. The court noted that extraor-
dinary writs can be denied for numerous reasons, some of which are 
not based on the merits of the petition.249 Because extraordinary writ 
petitions can be denied based on things other than the merits of the 
case, the court held that only elaborated denials indicating that the 
decision was made on the merits could have res judicata or collateral 
estoppel effect.250 Elaborating on this new requirement, the court 
opined:  
When a court intends to deny an extraordinary writ petition on the 
merits, the court need only include in its order a simple phrase 
such as “with prejudice” or “on the merits” to indicate that the 
merits of the case have been considered and determined and that 
the denial is on the merits.251 
The court’s decision may have come as a surprise based upon previ-
ous actions of the court. For instance, the court’s approach in Topps 
was a reversal of the approach it recommended in 1998 with its pro-
posed amendment to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100.252 
Furthermore, in Barwick v. State,253 the court specifically approved of 
the Third District’s practice of considering unelaborated denials as 
decisions on the merits.254 In Topps, the court receded from its ap-
proval of the Third District’s approach by adopting a different ap-
proach, stating that for a denial to be on the merits it must be ac-
companied with a statement such as “with prejudice.”255  
 The court’s decision to recede from a portion of its earlier decision 
was based on a desire for uniformity between the district courts of 
Appeal and a concern that substantive rights of litigants be pro-
                                                                                                                    
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. “Relief may not be granted for a number of reasons: the relief sought is either 
premature or moot, or the appellate court may deem it more appropriate to review the al-
legations on direct appeal later.” Id. at 1257 n.5.  
 250. Id. at 1258. The court’s holding operates prospectively so as not to burden the 
lower courts with the task of reviewing previous unelaborated denials. Id. 
 251. Id. The court was clear that this new requirement “does not require the lower tri-
bunals to issue an opinion in every writ case.” Id. 
 252. See id. at 1256.  
 253. 660 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1995), modified by Topps, 865 So. 2d 1258 n.6. 
 254. Topps, 865 So. 2d at 1258 n.6.  
 255. Id. 
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tected.256 The court’s decision was clearly the correct one. To bar a 
litigant from possible relief at a later date based on an unelaborated 
denial—a denial that may not have been decided on the merits of the 
case—is a great injustice. As the Topps court noted, “the idea under-
lying res judicata is that if a matter has already been decided, the 
petitioner has already had his or her day in court, and for purposes of 
judicial economy, that matter generally will not be reexamined again 
in any court.”257 The theory behind res judicata is not, however, to 
prevent a petitioner from his or her day in court based on a proce-
dural technicality such as the action being dismissed on ripeness or 
mootness grounds. The Topps decision eliminates this harsh possibil-
ity and provides a uniform approach for the Florida courts.  
TORTS—FLORIDA SUPREME COURT INVOKES THE “UNDERTAKER’S 
DOCTRINE” TO CREATE A TORT DUTY TO THE PUBLIC FOR ENTITIES 
RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING STREETLIGHTS—Clay Electric Coop-
erative, Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 2003). 
 The threshold question in a negligence claim is whether the de-
fendant owes the plaintiff a duty.258 Without a duty, a defendant is 
not obligated to act reasonably towards a plaintiff.259 As a “no duty” 
ruling effects a blanket denial of access to the courts, it is argued 
that a court should not dismiss a claim for want of duty unless cir-
cumstances clearly warrant the application of a general no-duty rule 
and the particular facts of the claim could not change the outcome.260 
If protecting plaintiffs’ access to the courts is the policy objective be-
hind the Florida Supreme Court’s holding in Clay Electric Coopera-
tive, Inc. v. Johnson,261 it succeeds to that end; however, in so ruling, 
the court departs from over seventy-five years of relatively clear 
precedent whereby a utility owes no tort duty to the public resulting 
from a public contract to supply a service.262 Further, the court’s ba-
sis for implying a common law duty—the “undertaker’s doctrine,”263— 
creates odd incentives for utilities in the position of providing ser-
vices to the public. Namely, the court provides an impetus for utili-
ties,264 which are capable of maintaining streetlights, to not enter the 
                                                                                                                    
 256. Id. at 1258.  
 257. Id. at 1255 (emphasis in original).  
 258. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53 (W. 
Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).  
 259. Id. 
 260. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 227 (2001). 
 261. 873 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 2003). 
 262. See H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 899 (1928); see also 
Arenado v. Fla Power & Light Co., 523 So. 2d 628, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). 
 263. Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1186.  
 264. This Note will refer to both utilities and municipalities as “utilities,” as the conse-
quences of Clay Electric are similar for utilities and all other governmental entities capable 
of supplying and maintaining street lighting. See id. at 1205 (Cantero, J., dissenting) 





streetlight-maintenance business altogether rather than face the 
costs and risks of litigation stemming from negligence claims by 
members of the public.265 
 In the predawn hours of September 4, 1997, Dante Johnson, a 
fourteen-year-old walking to his school bus stop, was struck and 
killed by a truck.266 The accident occurred in an area where a street-
light had malfunctioned; Clay Electric Cooperative (“Clay Electric”) 
had previously entered into a contract with the Jacksonville Electric 
Authority (JEA) assuming the responsibility of maintaining the 
streetlights along the street where the accident occurred.267 Johnson’s 
grandmother and Johnson’s estate each filed negligence actions 
against Clay Electric,268 alleging that Clay Electric had improperly 
maintained the streetlight, and that if the streetlight had functioned 
properly, the truck driver would have seen Johnson and avoided the 
collision.269 
 Clay Electric moved for summary judgment, which the trial court 
granted after drawing all reasonable inferences against Clay Elec-
tric, including: the driver of the truck was not negligent and if the 
streetlight had functioned, the accident would not have occurred.270 
The trial court concluded that Clay Electric’s contractual duty to the 
JEA to maintain the streetlight did not equate to a tort duty to John-
son. The First District Court of Appeal reversed,271 and the Florida 
Supreme Court granted review based upon a conflict between the 
First and Third District Courts of Appeal.272 
 Justice Shaw, writing for a five-justice majority, concluded that 
the trial court erred in dismissing Johnson’s claim for want of duty. 
Rather than applying the reasoning of Justice Cardozo in such cases, 
the supreme court forged its own path.273 To establish duty, the court 
                                                                                                                    
(“[M]unicipalities and utilities will ponder carefully before installing any new streetlights 
. . . .”). 
 265. See infra notes 289–92 and accompanying text. 
 266. Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1184. 
 267. Id. The JEA had installed the streetlights several years before the accident; the 
JEA and Clay Electric are each utilities. Id.  
 268. The cases were consolidated at trial. Id. 
 269. Id. The plaintiffs also named the truck driver and the truck owner as defendants. 
Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at 1184-85. The decedent and the grandmother appealed the motion, the truck 
owner filed a separate appeal, and the cases were consolidated before the supreme court. 
Id. at 1185. 
 272. Id. In Martinez v. Florida Power & Light Co., the court affirmed summary judg-
ment in favor of a utility responsible for maintaining a streetlight, holding that a contract 
to maintain streetlights did not create a common law tort duty. 785 So. 2d 1251, 1253 (Fla. 
3d DCA 2001), quashed by 863 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 2003). 
 273. Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1188-89. In H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., the 
defendant utility, contractually obligated to supply water to the City of Rensselaer, failed 
to provide adequate water pressure to a fire hydrant. 159 N.E. 896, 896-97 (1928). A build-
ing caught fire, but the lack of water pressure caused the building to suffer a total loss. Id. 
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invoked the undertaker’s doctrine, which requires one who goes for-
ward providing a service to act carefully and not place others in 
harm’s way.274 Duty under the doctrine is broader than merely for 
parties in privity—an undertaking may create a duty to third par-
ties.275 Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts,276 the court con-
cluded that Clay Electric should have foreseen its inoperative street-
lights could increase the risk of harm to third parties using the 
streets.277 The court analyzed “increased risk” as whether the negli-
gent maintenance creates increased risk as compared to if the main-
tenance had occurred, rather than whether negligent maintenance 
creates increased risk as compared to if the undertaken service had 
not been provided at all.278 
                                                                                                                    
The building’s owners filed a negligence action, but the New York Court of Appeals held 
that the utility’s contract with the city to maintain water pressure did not create a duty to 
the public allowing negligence actions against the utility when the utility breached the 
contract. Id. at 897. H.R. Moch is regarded as the seminal case for the duty of a public util-
ity company. See Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1196-98 (Cantero, J., dissenting); see also 
Arenado v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 523 So. 2d 628, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Nonetheless, 
the majority elected not to follow H.R. Moch, as it was decided when the undertaker’s doc-
trine was “ill-defined” and the New York court did not have the benefit of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts to guide its analysis. Id. at 1188. 
 274. Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1186. 
 275. Id. Contra Nicole Rosenkrantz, Note, The Parent Trap: Using the Good Samaritan 
Doctrine to Hold Parent Corporations Directly Liable for Their Negligence, 37 B.C. L. REV. 
1061, 1063 (1996) (“Although the existence of a special relationship is not explicitly man-
dated by [Restatement (Second) of Torts] section 324A, plaintiffs were rarely successful in 
asserting [section 324A] claims absent a showing that such a special relationship ex-
isted.”). 
 276. The Restatement (Second) provides: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to 
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third 
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm 
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertak-
ing, if 
 (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or 
 . . . .  
 (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person 
upon the undertaking. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965). 
 277. Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1186-87. 
 278. Id. at 1187. This point was sharply contested by the dissent. See id. at 1199 
(Cantero, J., dissenting) (“[T]he failure to maintain an installed streetlight does not create 
a greater risk than that created by the absence of a streetlight. It simply reverts the cir-
cumstances to the status quo ante—darkness.”). Indeed, the majority creates an interesting 
paradigm where a utility is under no duty in the first to install street lighting, but once 
street lighting is provided, the utility must be vigilant to ensure its continued proper func-
tioning. See id. at 1186-87. The majority does not cite any authority for its distinction be-
tween negligent maintenance and negligent installation. See id. at 1187-88. Further, a 
governmental entity may, in its discretion, decide to conserve resources by not lighting all 
streetlights at all times and may still avoid a negligence claim. Id. at 1188. The differ-
ence—a conscious decision either not to supply lighting at all or not to supply lighting at a 
particular time, versus not supplying lighting involuntarily due to negligent mainte-
nance—is difficult to see.  





 As a second predicate for duty, the court also indicated that Clay 
Electric induced reliance on the part of the plaintiffs by undertaking 
to provide street lighting.279 Reasoning that Johnson’s grandmother 
arguably only allowed Johnson to walk in the early-morning dark-
ness because of her belief that the streets were lighted, the court 
stated that this reliance was a possible separate, second basis to im-
ply a duty to the plaintiffs.280 
 In a concurring opinion, Justice Pariente opined that Clay Elec-
tric’s agreement to maintain the streetlights also created an addi-
tional basis for a common law tort duty.281 Relying on a pair of Flor-
ida cases for the proposition that a contractual duty to provide a ser-
vice may create a duty to the public, Justice Pariente reasoned that 
Clay Electric’s contract extended the foreseeable zone of risk and im-
plied a duty upon Clay Electric.282 Additionally, the concurring opin-
ion emphasized that the court’s imposition of duty was not a deter-
mination of Clay Electric’s liability, but rather, a shift in the focus of 
the inquiry to the jury to find whether Clay Electric was negligent, 
and if so, whether the negligence was the legal cause of Johnson’s 
death.283 
 In addition to the concerns discussed above,284 the dissent, in an 
opinion authored by Justice Cantero and joined by Justice Wells, of-
fered a number of public policy reasons why the court should not im-
ply a duty to the public upon companies that have agreed to main-
tain streetlights. These include: risks for nighttime automobile acci-
dents are best borne by automobile insurance companies rather than 
streetlight maintenance companies, the costs of maintaining street-
                                                                                                                    
 279. Id.  
 280. Id. Record testimony did not indicate such reliance had occurred; further, evi-
dence at trial showed that the streetlights were inoperative for some time. See id. at 1200 
(Cantero, J., dissenting) (citing testimony that the streetlights had “never worked” and be-
cause reliance was not alleged at trial, inference of reliance by the majority was inappro-
priate). 
 281. Id. at 1192 (Pariente, J., concurring). 
 282. Id. (citing Mugge v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 42 So. 81 (1906), and Woodbury v. 
Tampa Waterworks Co., 49 So. 556 (1909)). The dissent cited Mugge and Woodbury for the 
opposite proposition—when an entity contracts with a government, the contract itself de-
termines the scope of the entity’s duty to the public, and in the cases of Mugge and Wood-
bury, the utilities had contractually assumed a duty to the public. See id. at 1201-02 
(Cantero, J., dissenting); see also Arenado v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 523 So. 2d 628, 629 
(Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (stating the duty to the public assumed by the utilities in Mugge and 
Woodbury was predicated upon the terms of the contract). 
 283. Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1193-95 (Pariente, J., concurring). 
 284. These include: the majority places Florida in the slim minority of jurisdictions 
that have considered negligent streetlight maintenance and overlooks seventy-five years of 
precedent, relying upon the logic of H.R. Moch, whereby utilities have no duty to the public 
for the denial of a benefit, supra note 273 and accompanying text; when a utility enters a 
contract with a governmental entity, that contract determines the scope and existence, if 
any, of the utility’s duty to the public, supra note 282 and accompanying text; the majority 
misinterprets the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A, supra notes 278, 280 and ac-
companying text.  
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lights exceeds the value conferred by such maintenance, and the ex-
cessive maintenance costs will ultimately pass to the consumer.285 
 The majority’s holding guarantees a class of plaintiffs—those ag-
grieved by a malfunctioning streetlight, as well as possibly a broader 
class encompassing any recipient of a benefit of a public government 
contract—a trial on the merits of a negligence claim.286 This is consis-
tent with the role of duty in a negligence claim argued for by some 
commentators; that is, a court should not dismiss a negligence claim 
for “no duty” lightly, especially if a claim could turn on particular 
facts.287 To get to this result, the court distinguished the precedent of 
H.R. Moch,288 even though all Florida courts that had considered the 
scenario prior to Johnson’s claim had followed H.R. Moch.289 Further, 
though the majority dismisses the dissent’s articulated policy con-
cerns as speculative,290 the dissent’s concerns are not illogical. The 
majority creates a state of the law where a utility has no duty to in-
stall lighting, but once lighting is installed and the utility agrees to 
maintain the lights, the utility cannot easily dismiss claims for negli-
gent maintenance against them.291 Florida utilities are not free to in-
crease the rates they charge to compensate for the increased costli-
ness of litigation following Clay Electric, unless the Public Service 
Commission (PSC) approves the increase.292 It does not take a logical 
leap to foresee utilities halting entering the streetlight maintenance 
                                                                                                                    
 285. Clay Elec., at 1203-04 (Cantero, J., dissenting). The majority dismissed the dis-
sent’s policy concerns as “speculation” and for the legislature to consider, rather than the 
courts. Id. at 1189-90. 
 286. One of the concerns regarding the proposed legislation to overturn Clay Electric, 
discussed infra notes 297-02, was that the bill would violate the provision of the Florida 
Constitution guaranteeing access to the courts. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, HB 
1573 (2004) Staff Analysis 5 (Mar. 26, 2004)  (on file with comm.),  http://www.flsenate.gov/ 
data/session/2004/House/bills/analysis/pdf/h1573.ju.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2004). 
 287. See DOBBS, supra note 260, § 227. 
 288. See Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1188-89. The significance of H.R. Moch is discussed 
supra note 273. 
 289. See, e.g., Batista v. City of Miami, 780 So. 2d 335, 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) 873 So. 
2d at 1182, Arenado v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 523 So. 2d 628, 628 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), 
overruled by overruled by Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1188. 
 290. Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1189. 
 291. See supra note 277 and accompanying text. 
 292. See FLA. STAT. § 366.06(1) (2003) (“A public utility shall not . . . charge or receive 
any rate not on file with the commission for the particular class of service involved . . . . 
[T]he commission shall have the authority to determine and fix . . . reasonable rates that 
may be requested, demanded, charged, or collected by any public utility for its service.”). 
Alternatively, if the PSC allows utilities to charge higher rates due to the increased finan-
cial risk in streetlight maintenance following Clay Electric, the dissent’s fears of passing on 
to consumers the ultimate cost of liability will be realized. See Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 
1204 (Cantero, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is the ratepayers who will bear the brunt through 
higher rate structures.”). 





business altogether—rather than promote non-negligent action, the 
opinion provides an incentive to not provide streetlights at all.293 
 The Clay Electric opinion has already had nonspeculative ef-
fects—it has precipitated action in the lower appellate courts as well 
as the Florida Legislature. The Fourth District Court of Appeal ap-
plied the new precedent of Clay Electric to reverse a trial court sum-
mary judgment. In Dolan v. Florida Power & Light Co.,294 a trial 
court had granted summary judgment for the defendant utility in a 
wrongful death action. David Dolan was killed in a motorcycle acci-
dent allegedly caused by a negligently maintained overhead street-
light.295 Consistent with Clay Electric, the Fourth District overturned 
the summary judgment and remanded the action for trial.296 
 The Clay Electric opinion also sparked an attempt by the 2004 
Legislature to overrule the opinion. Under House Bill 1573, no entity 
responsible for providing or maintaining a streetlight “owes a duty to 
the public to provide, operate, or maintain the illumination in any 
manner, except that such a duty may be expressly assumed by writ-
ten contract.”297 Additionally, the bill provided that neither the state, 
its officers, agencies, and instrumentalities, nor electric utilities, that 
maintain streetlights would be liable for civil damages for injury or 
death caused by inadequate or failed illumination.298 House Bill 1573 
was approved by a 90-25 vote; however, its Senate counterpart died 
in committee.299 After the legislation seeking to overturn Clay Elec-
tric failed, it bodes to be an interesting year with regard to how utili-
ties react to minimize the risk of litigation under Clay Electric. 
 
                                                                                                                    
 293. See Clay Elec., 873 So. 2d at 1205 (Cantero, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur streets will not 
become safer. Rather, municipalities and utilities will ponder carefully before installing 
any new streetlights, . . . as it will only increase their potential liability.”). Further, the dis-
sent does not address the impact of Clay Electric upon existing streetlight maintenance 
contracts. Clay Electric may foreshadow the nonrenewal or termination of these agree-
ments if streetlight maintenance is not sufficiently profitable in the face of the now-
heightened prospect of liability. For example, Florida Power & Light Co. (FPL), a Florida 
investor-owned utility regulated by the PSC, is allowed to charge from $1.36 to $3.47 per 
month for maintenance of FPL-owned streetlights, which is included in the total rate for a 
streetlight ranging from $5.51 to $20.97, depending upon the type of light. FPL Co., Street 
Lighting,   Tariff    Sheet    No.  8.716    (Mar. 7, 2003),  http://www.fpl.com/about/rates/pdf/ 
electric_tariff_section8.pdf. It is possible that utilities will view streetlights as a poor in-
vestment compared to the risk of costly litigation and not renew maintenance agreements, 
forcing either local governments to pay for street light maintenance or the streetlights to 
fall into disuse. 
 294. 872 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). 
 295. Id. at 275. 
 296. Id. at 276. 
 297. Fla. HB 1573, § 1 (2004) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 768.1382). 
 298. Id. 
 299. FLA. LEGIS., WEEKLY LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 2004 REGULAR SESSION, 
HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 112, HB 1537. 
